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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
This case involves allegations that the anti-depressant 
drug Zoloft, manufactured by Pfizer, causes cardiac birth 
defects when taken during early pregnancy.  In support of 
their position, plaintiffs, through a Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee (PSC), depended upon the testimony of Dr. 
Nicholas Jewell, Ph.D.  Dr. Jewell used the “Bradford Hill” 
criteria1 to analyze existing literature on the causal connection 
between Zoloft and birth defects.  The District Court 
excluded this testimony and granted summary judgment to 
defendants.  The PSC now appeals these orders, alleging that 
1) the District Court erroneously held that an expert opinion 
on general causation must be supported by replicated 
observational studies reporting a statistically significant 
association between the drug and the adverse effect, and 2) it 
was an abuse of discretion to exclude Dr. Jewell’s testimony.  
Because we find that the District Court did not establish such 
a legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
Dr. Jewell’s testimony, we will affirm the District Court’s 
orders.   
I. 
This case arises from multi-district litigation involving 
315 product liability claims against Pfizer, alleging that 
Zoloft, a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), causes 
cardiac birth defects.  The PSC introduced a number of 
experts in order to establish causation.  The testimony of each 
of these experts was excluded in whole or in part.  In 
particular, the court excluded all of the testimony of Dr. 
Anick Bérard (an epidemiologist), which relied on the “novel 
                                                 
1 See Section II.B infra. 
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technique of drawing conclusions by examining ‘trends’ 
(often statistically non-significant) across selected studies.”2  
The PSC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the 
decision to exclude the testimony of Dr. Bérard, which the 
District Court denied.  The PSC then moved to admit Dr. 
Jewell (a statistician) as a general causation witness.  Pfizer 
filed a motion to exclude Dr. Jewell, and the District Court 
conducted a Daubert3 hearing.   
 
The District Court considered Dr. Jewell’s application 
of various methodologies, reviewing his expert report, 
rebuttal reports, party briefs, and oral testimony.  The District 
Court first examined how Dr. Jewell applied the traditional 
methodology of analyzing replicated, significant results.  
While Dr. Jewell discussed many groupings of cardiac birth 
defects, he focused on the significant findings for all cardiac 
defects and septal defects.  Dr. Jewell presented two studies 
reporting a significant association between Zoloft and all 
cardiac defects (Kornum (2010)4 and Jimenez-Solem 
(2012)5).  He also presented five studies reporting a 
                                                 
2 In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrochloride) Prods. Liab. Litig. 
(Zoloft I), 26 F. Supp. 3d 449, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  Since Dr. 
Jewell seems to provide similar testimony, we take into 
account the District Court’s rationale in excluding Dr. Bérard.   
3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
4 JA 1059-67.  Jette B. Kornum, et al., Use of Selective 
Serotonin-Reuptake Inhibitors During Early Pregnancy and 
Risk of Congenital Malformations:  Updated Analysis, 2 Clin. 
Epidemiol. 29 (2010). 
5 JA 1040-51.  Espen Jimenez-Solem, et al., Exposure to 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors and the Risk of 
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significant association between Zoloft and septal defects 
(Kornum (2010), Jimenez-Solem (2012), Louik (2007),6 
Pedersen (2009),7 and Bérard (2015)8).  After excluding two 
studies from its consideration,9 the District Court expressed 
two concerns with the remaining studies:  Jimenez-Solem 
(2012), Kornum (2010), and Pedersen (2009).  First, despite 
the fact that the remaining studies produced consistent results, 
the District Court did not consider them to be independent 
replications because they used overlapping Danish 
                                                                                                             
Congenital Malformations:  A Nationwide Cohort Study, 2 
British Med. J. Open 1148 (May 2012). 
6 JA 5622-34.  Carol Louik, et al., First-Trimester Use of 
Selective Serotonin-Reuptake Inhibitors and the Risk of Birth 
Defects, 356 N. Eng. J. Med. 2675 (June 2007). 
7 JA 1030-39.  Lars H. Pedersen, et al., Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitors in Pregnancy and Congenital 
Malformations:  Population Based Cohort Study, 339 British 
Med. J. 3569 (Sept. 2009). 
8 JA 5987-99.  Anick Bérard, Sertraline Use During 
Pregnancy and the Risk of Major Malformations, 212 Am. J. 
Obstet. Gynecol. 795 (2015). 
9 The District Court noted that during the trial, a transcription 
error was found in Louik (2007), which led to a significant 
result for septal defects being reclassified as insignificant.  JA 
65.  The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) required 
the author to revise his discussion in light of this change.  
Additionally, multiple people tried to replicate the results in 
Bérard (2015)—including Dr. Jewell, a member of the PSC’s 
legal team, and Pfizer’s experts—and failed.  The District 
Court did not allow Dr. Jewell to rely on Bérard (2015) after 
Dr. Jewell consequently “expressed a lack of confidence” 
about its reliability on cross-examination.  JA 64-65.  
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populations.  Second, a larger study, Furu (2015),10 included 
almost all the data from Jimenez-Solem (2012), Kornum 
(2010), and Pedersen (2009) and did not replicate the findings 
of those studies.  Dr. Jewell did not explain the reasons why 
this attempted replication produced different results or why 
the new study did not contradict his opinion.   
 
The court then examined Dr. Jewell’s reliance on 
insignificant results, noting that it was very similar to Dr. 
Bérard’s methodology.  The court noted that Dr. Jewell did 
not provide any evidence that the epidemiology or 
teratology11 communities value statistical significance12 any 
                                                 
10 JA 4395-4404.  Kari Furu, et al., Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitors and Venlafaxine in Early Pregnancy and 
Risk of Birth Defects:  Population Based Cohort Study and 
Sibling Design, 350 British Med. J. 1798 (Mar. 2015).  This 
study was not available to Dr. Jewell when he prepared his 
report, but the District Court noted that Dr. Jewell testified 
that he was familiar with it. JA 63, 7297-327. 
11 As the District Court noted, “[t]eratology is the scientific 
field which deals with the cause and prevention of birth 
defects. . . . [Where a drug is alleged to be] a teratogen, it is 
common to put forth experts whose opinions are based on 
epidemiological evidence.”  JA 52. 
12 The findings in these studies are often expressed in terms of 
“odds ratios.”  Odds ratios are merely “a measure of 
association.”  JA 2446.  An odds ratio of 1, in the context of 
these studies, generally means that there is no observed 
association between taking Zoloft and experiencing a cardiac 
birth defect.  Since these odds ratios are just estimates, a 
confidence interval is used to show the precision of the 
estimate.  JA 2439-40.  If the confidence interval contains the 
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less than it has traditionally been understood.13  The court 
also expressed concern that Dr. Jewell inconsistently applied 
his “technique” of multiplying p-values14 and his trend 
analysis.   
 
The District Court critiqued several other techniques 
Dr. Jewell used in analyzing the evidence.  First, Dr. Jewell 
rejected meta-analyses on which he had previously relied in a 
lawsuit against another SSRI, Prozac.  The meta-analyses 
reported insignificant associations with birth defects for 
Zoloft but not for Prozac.  Dr. Jewell rationalized his decision 
to ignore these meta-analyses because the “heterogeneity”15 
within its Zoloft studies was significant; the District Court 
                                                                                                             
odds ratio of 1, the risk of cardiac birth defects while taking 
Zoloft is not considered “significantly” greater than the risk 
while not taking Zoloft.       
13 The District Court instead noted that the NEJM’s treatment 
of the Louik (2007) transcription error suggests that the 
epidemiology and teratology communities still strongly value 
significance.  JA 67. 
14 A “p-value” indicates the likelihood that the difference 
between the observed and the expected value (based on the 
null hypothesis) of a parameter occurs purely by chance.  JA 
2396.  In this context, the null hypothesis is that the odds ratio 
is one; rejecting the null hypothesis suggests there is a 
significant association between Zoloft and cardiac birth 
defects.     
15 The District Court quoted Dr. Jewell in defining 
heterogeneity as “the measure of the variation among the 
effect sizes reported in [various] studies [and] . . . where 
heterogeneity is significant, the source of variation should be 
investigated and discussed.”  JA 70.   
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accepted this explanation but questioned why Dr. Jewell 
“fails to statistically calculate the heterogeneity” across other 
studies instead of relying on trends.16  Second, Dr. Jewell 
reanalyzed two studies, Jimenez-Solem (2012) and 
Huybrechts (2014),17 both of which had originally concluded 
that there was no significant effect attributable to Zoloft.18  
The District Court questioned his rationale for conducting, 
and tactics for implementing, this reanalysis.  Finally, Dr. 
Jewell conducted a meta-analysis with Huybrechts (2014) and 
Jimenez-Solem (2012).  The District Court questioned why he 
used only those particular studies.19   
Based on this analysis, the District Court found that 
Dr. Jewell, tasked with explaining his opinion about Zoloft’s 
effect on birth defects and reconciling contrary studies, 
                                                 
16 JA 72. 
17 JA 4256-67.  Krista F. Huybrechts, et al. Antidepressant 
Use in Pregnancy and the Risk of Cardiac Defect, 370 N. 
Eng. J. Med. 2397 (2014). 
18 Jimenez-Solem (2012) found that both current Zoloft users 
and SSRI users who “paused” their use during pregnancy had 
elevated risks of birth defects; this study concluded that the 
increased risk resulted from a confounding factor.  JA 1044, 
1047-48.  Huybrechts (2014) found the increase in the risk of 
cardiac birth defects from taking Zoloft to be insignificant.  
JA 4257-67.   
19 Additionally, the District Court found that Dr. Jewell may 
have relied on a Periodic Safety Update Report, which 
contains literature reviews, and email correspondence 
summarizing a literature review.  The District Court excluded 
this testimony because this is not the type of information 
statisticians generally rely on.  This exclusion is not contested 
here.  
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“failed to consistently apply the scientific methods he 
articulates, has deviated from or downplayed certain well-
established principles of his field, and has inconsistently 
applied methods and standards to the data so as to support his 
a priori opinion.”20  For this reason, on December 2, 2015, 
the District Court entered an order, excluding Dr. Jewell’s 
testimony, and on April 5, 2016, the court granted Pfizer’s 
motion for summary judgment.  The PSC appeals the 
exclusion of Dr. Jewell and the grant of summary judgment.21   
                                                 
20 JA 82.   
21 The PSC concedes that if the exclusion of Dr. Jewell was 
proper, it is unable to establish general causation and 
summary judgment was properly granted.  Oral Argument 
Recording at 13:30-13:59, 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
2247In%20Re%20Zoloft.mp3.  
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II.22 
In general, courts serve as gatekeepers for expert 
witness testimony.  “A witness who is qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if,” inter alia, 
“the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods[] and . . . the expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”23  In 
determining the reliability of novel scientific methodology, 
courts can consider multiple factors, including the testability 
of the hypothesis, whether it has been peer reviewed or 
published, the error rate, whether standards controlling the 
technique’s operation exist, and whether the methodology is 
                                                 
22 The District Court had jurisdiction over this claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review questions of law de 
novo, and questions of fact for clear error.  Ragen Corp. v. 
Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619, 626 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(citations omitted).  We review the decision to exclude expert 
testimony for abuse of discretion.  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB 
Litig. (In re Paoli), 35 F.3d 717, 749 (3d Cir. 1994).  
However, when the exclusion of such evidence results in a 
summary judgment, we perform a “hard look” analysis to 
determine if a district court has abused its discretion.  Id. at 
750.  An abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision 
“rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact” 
or “when no reasonable person would adopt the district 
court's view.”  Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 
(3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
23 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
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generally accepted.24  Both an expert’s methodology and the 
application of that methodology must be reviewed for 
reliability.25  A court should not, however, usurp the role of 
the fact-finder; instead, an expert should only be excluded if 
“the flaw is large enough that the expert lacks the ‘good 
grounds’ for his or her conclusions.”26   
 
Central to this case is the question of whether 
statistical significance is necessary to prove causality.  We 
decline to state a bright-line rule.  Instead, we reiterate that 
plaintiffs ultimately must prove a causal connection between 
Zoloft and birth defects.  A causal connection may exist 
despite the lack of significant findings, due to issues such as 
random misclassification or insufficient power.27  Conversely, 
a causal connection may not exist despite the presence of 
significant findings.  If a causal connection does not actually 
exist, significant findings can still occur due to, inter alia, 
inability to control for a confounding effect or detection bias.  
A standard based on replication of statistically significant 
                                                 
24 In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742. 
25 Id. at 745 (“However, after Daubert [v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)], we no longer think that 
the distinction between a methodology and its application is 
viable.”). 
26 In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 665 (3d Cir. 1999), 
amended, 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
27 Power is “the chance that a statistical test will declare an 
effect when there is an effect to be declared.  This chance 
depends on the size of the effect and the size of the sample.  
Discerning subtle differences requires large samples; small 
samples may fail to detect substantial differences.”  JA 2409.   
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findings obscures the essential issue:  a causal connection.  
Given this, the requisite proof necessary to establish causation 
will vary greatly case by case.  This is not to suggest, 
however, that statistical significance is irrelevant.  Despite the 
problems with treating statistical significance as a magic 
criterion, it remains an important metric to distinguish 
between results supporting a true association and those 
resulting from mere chance.  Discussions of statistical 
significance should thus not understate or overstate its 
importance.   
 
With this in mind, we proceed to the issues at hand.  
The PSC raises two issues on appeal:  1) whether the District 
Court erroneously concluded that reliability requires 
replicated, statistically significant findings, and 2) whether 
Dr. Jewell’s testimony was properly excluded.   
 
A. 
The PSC argues that the District Court erroneously 
held that replicated, statistically significant findings are 
necessary to satisfy reliability.  This argument seems to have 
been originally raised in the motion for reconsideration of Dr. 
Bérard’s exclusion.  Explaining its decision to exclude Dr. 
Bérard, the District Court cited a previous case, Wade-Greaux 
v. Whitehall Labs, Inc., for the proposition that the teratology 
community generally requires replicated, significant 
epidemiological results before inferring causality.28  The PSC 
                                                 
28 Zoloft I, 26 F. Supp.3d at 454 n.13 (citing Wade-Greaux v. 
Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1453 (D.V.I. 1994) 
aff'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994), for text, see No. 94-7199, 
1994 WL 16973481 (3d Cir. Dec. 15, 1994)).   
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claims that in so doing, the District Court was asserting a 
legal standard that required replicated, significant findings for 
reliability.29  Pfizer contends that the District Court merely 
made a factual finding about what the teratology community 
generally accepts.   
 
Upon review, it is clear that the District Court was not 
creating a legal standard, but merely making a factual finding.  
The PSC argues that the District Court must have created a 
legal standard because it did not cite any sources other than 
Wade-Greaux to support its assertion that the teratology 
community generally requires replicated, significant 
epidemiological findings.  However, in its initial exclusion of 
Dr. Bérard, the District Court noted that it looked to the 
standards adopted by “other epidemiologists, even the very 
researchers [Dr. Bérard] cites in her report.”30  Similarly, in 
                                                 
29 Relatedly, the PSC claims that the District Court made a 
legal standard that “it was not reliable for Dr. Jewell to 
invoke studies observing non-statistically significant positive 
associations.”  However, the language cited does not support 
this conclusion:  The District Court merely asserts that 
“experts may use congruent but non-significant data to bolster 
inferences drawn from replicated, statistically significant 
data.  However, in this case . . . three of the studies Dr. Jewell 
relies upon to show replication use overlapping data . . . [and] 
have not been replicated by later, well-powered studies which 
attempt to control for various confounding factors and 
biases.”  JA 67-68.   
30 Zoloft I, 26 F. Supp. 3d  at 456 (“There exists a well-
established methodology used by scientists in her field of 
epidemiology, and Dr. Bérard herself has utilized it in her 
published, peer-reviewed work. The ‘evolution’ in thinking 
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its order denying general reconsideration of Dr. Bérard’s 
exclusion, the District Court clarified that it “made this 
factual finding after review of the published literature relied 
upon by Dr. Bérard and other experts, as well as its review of 
the reports and testimony of both parties”31 and merely used 
this factual finding as part of its FRE 702 analysis.32  While 
the District Court does cite Wade-Greaux,33 it uses it merely 
to show “that other courts have made similar findings 
regarding the prevailing standards for scientists in Dr. 
Bérard’s field.”34   
 
                                                                                                             
about the importance of statistical significance Dr. Bérard 
refers to does not appear to have been adopted by other 
epidemiologists, even the very researchers she cites in her 
report.”).   
31 In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrocloride) Prod. Liab. Litig. 
(Zoloft II), No. 12-2342, 2015 WL 314149, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 23, 2015); see, e.g., JA 3962, 3971-72.  
32 While general acceptance by the scientific community is no 
longer dispositive in the Rule 702 analysis, it remains a factor 
that a court may consider.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (“[A] 
known technique which has been able to attract only minimal 
support within the community may properly be viewed with 
skepticism.”) (internal quotation marks and internal citation 
omitted).   
33 Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1453 (noting that “[a]bsent 
consistent, repeated human epidemiological studies showing a 
statistically significant increased risk of particular birth 
defects associated with exposure to a specific agent, the 
community of teratologists does not conclude that the agent is 
a human teratogen.”). 
34 Zoloft II, 2015 WL 314149, at *2.   
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Second, the course of the proceedings make clear that 
the replication of significant results was not dispositive in 
establishing whether the testimony of either Dr. Bérard or Dr. 
Jewell was reliable.  In fact, the District Court expressly 
rejected Pfizer’s argument that the existence of a statistically 
significant, replicated result is a threshold issue before an 
expert can conduct the Bradford-Hill analysis.35  In doing so, 
the District Court was clear that it was not requiring a 
threshold showing of statistical significance.  Similarly, the 
District Court did not end its inquiry after analyzing whether 
there were replicated, significant results.  Instead, the District 
Court examined other techniques of general trend analysis, 
reanalysis of other studies, and meta-analysis.  Even though it 
ultimately rejected the application of these techniques as 
unreliable, it did not categorically reject alternative 
techniques, suggesting that it did not make a legal standard 
requiring replicated, significant results.  
 
For these reasons, we find that the District Court did 
not require replication of significant results to establish 
reliability.  Instead, it merely made a factual finding that 
teratologists generally require replication of significant 
results, and this factual finding did not prevent it from 
considering other evidence of reliability.36   
                                                 
35 Id. (“In so doing, the Court rejected Pfizer's argument that 
the Court could exclude Dr. Bérard's opinion without even 
reaching her Bradford–Hill analysis, because the Bradford–
Hill criteria should only be applied after an association is well 
established”); see also Zoloft I, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 462.  
36 The PSC also argues that the District Court did not discuss 
one study providing a significant, positive association 
between Zoloft and birth defects, Wemakor (2015).  The PSC 
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B. 
The second issue on appeal is whether it was an abuse 
of discretion for the District Court to exclude Dr. Jewell’s 
testimony.  Dr. Jewell utilized a combination of two methods: 
the “weight of the evidence” analysis and the Bradford Hill 
criteria.  The “weight of the evidence” analysis involves a 
series of logical steps used to “infer[] to the best 
explanation[.]”37  The Bradford Hill criteria are metrics that 
epidemiologists use to distinguish a causal connection from a 
mere association.  These metrics include strength of the 
association, consistency, specificity, temporality, coherence, 
biological gradient, plausibility, experimental evidence, and 
analogy.38  In his expert report, Dr. Jewell seems to utilize 
numerous “techniques” in implementing the weight of the 
evidence methodology.  Dr. Jewell discusses whether the 
                                                                                                             
claims this is “reversible error because it inaccurately 
depicted Dr. Jewell’s opinion as unsupported by replicated, 
non-overlapping data.”  Pfizer argues that the District Court 
did not have to mention each study and that Wemakor is 
unreliable, as the authors themselves admit that their findings 
are “compatible with confounding by depression as indication 
or other associated factors/exposures.”  We conclude that this 
was not an error because it is clear the District Court 
considered Wemakor in the Daubert hearing.  Even if the 
District Court had failed to consider Wemakor, we would find 
no error because it did not require replicated, statistically 
significant findings as a legal requirement.   
37 Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 
17 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
38 JA 5652-56. 
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conclusions drawn from these techniques satisfy the Bradford 
Hill criteria and support the existence of a causal 
connection.39   
 
Pfizer does not seem to contest the reliability of the 
Bradford Hill criteria or weight of the evidence analysis 
generally; the dispute centers on whether the specific 
methodology implemented by Dr. Jewell is reliable.  Flexible 
methodologies, such as the “weight of the evidence,” can be 
implemented in multiple ways; despite the fact that the 
methodology is generally reliable, each application is distinct 
and should be analyzed for reliability.  In In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litigation, this Circuit noted that while differential 
diagnosis—also a flexible methodology—is generally 
accepted, “no particular combination of techniques chosen by 
a doctor to assess an individual patient is likely to have been 
generally accepted.”40  Accordingly, we subjected the 
expert’s specific differential diagnosis process to a Daubert 
inquiry.41  We noted that “to the extent that a doctor utilizes 
standard diagnostic techniques in gathering this information, 
the more likely we are to find that the doctor’s methodology 
is reliable.”42  While we did not require the expert to run 
specific tests or ascertain full information in order for the 
differential diagnosis to be reliable, we did require him to 
explain why his conclusion remained reliable in the face of 
                                                 
39 Pfizer argues that PSC did not previously use the “weight 
of the evidence” terminology for the method followed by Dr. 
Jewell.  We assume for the sake of argument that this was the 
purported methodology all along.   
40 In re Paoli, 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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alternate causes.43  
 
This standard, while articulated with respect to 
differential diagnoses, applies to the weight of the evidence 
analysis.  We have briefly encountered the Bradford Hill 
criteria/weight of the evidence methodology in Magistrini v. 
One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, a nonprecedential 
affirmance of the District of New Jersey’s exclusion of an 
expert.44  The expert followed the weight of the evidence 
methodology, including epidemiological findings assessed 
using the Bradford Hill criteria.  The District Court 
acknowledged that although the weight of the evidence 
methodology was generally reliable, “[t]he particular 
combination of evidence considered and weighed here has not 
been subjected to peer review.”45  Similar concerns are 
arguably present for the Bradford Hill criteria, which are 
                                                 
43 Id. at 760 (“[T]he district court abused its discretion in 
excluding that opinion under Rule 702 unless either (1) Dr. 
Sherman or DiGregorio engaged in very few standard 
diagnostic techniques by which doctors normally rule out 
alternative causes and the doctor offered no good explanation 
as to why his or her conclusion remained reliable, or (2) the 
defendants pointed to some likely cause of the plaintiff's 
illness other than the defendants’ actions and Dr. Sherman or 
DiGregorio offered no reasonable explanation as to why he or 
she still believed that the defendants' actions were a 
substantial factor in bringing about that illness.”). 
44 Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 68 F. 
App’x 356 (3d Cir. 2003). 
45 Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. 
Supp. 2d 584, 602 (D.N.J. 2002). 
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neither an exhaustive nor a necessary list.46  An expert can 
theoretically assign the most weight to only a few factors, or 
draw conclusions about one factor based on a particular 
combination of evidence.  The specific way an expert 
conducts such an analysis must be reliable; “all of the 
relevant evidence must be gathered, and the assessment or 
weighing of that evidence must not be arbitrary, but must 
itself be based on methods of science.”47  To ensure that the 
Bradford Hill/weight of the evidence criteria “is truly a 
methodology, rather than a mere conclusion-oriented 
selection process . . . there must be a scientific method of 
weighting that is used and explained.”48  For this reason, the 
specific techniques by which the weight of the 
evidence/Bradford Hill methodology is conducted must 
themselves be reliable according to the principles articulated 
in Daubert.49   
 
In short, despite the fact that both the Bradford Hill 
and the weight of the evidence analyses are generally reliable, 
                                                 
46 Milward, 639 F.3d at 17. 
47 Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 602.    
48 Id. at 607.   
49 There has been very little circuit authority regarding the 
application of the Bradford Hill criteria in the weight of the 
evidence analysis.  The First Circuit has warned against 
“treat[ing] the separate evidentiary components of [the] 
analysis atomistically, as though [the] ultimate opinion was 
independently supported by each.”  Milward, 639 F.3d at 23.  
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit briefly discussed the Bradford 
Hill criteria, and then separately conducted a Daubert 
analysis for each body of evidence.  Hollander v. Sandoz 
Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1204-13 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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the “techniques” used to implement the analysis must be 1) 
reliable and 2) reliably applied.  In discussing the conclusions 
produced by such techniques in light of the Bradford Hill 
criteria, an expert must explain 1) how conclusions are drawn 
for each Bradford Hill criterion and 2) how the criteria are 
weighed relative to one another.  Here, we accept that the 
Bradford Hill and weight of the evidence analyses are 
generally reliable.  We also assume that the “techniques” used 
to implement the analysis (here, meta-analysis, trend analysis, 
and reanalysis) are themselves reliable.  However, we find 
that Dr. Jewell did not 1) reliably apply the “techniques” to 
the body of evidence or 2) adequately explain how this 
analysis supports specified Bradford Hill criteria.  Because 
“any step that renders the analysis unreliable under the 
Daubert factors renders the expert’s testimony 
inadmissible,”50 this is sufficient to show that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Jewell’s 
testimony.   
 
1. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court 
to find Dr. Jewell’s application of trend analysis, reanalysis, 
and meta-analysis to the body of evidence to be unreliable.  
Here, we assume the techniques listed are generally reliable 
and rest on the fact that they were unreliably applied.  As 
stated in In re Paoli, use of standard techniques bolster the 
inference of reliability;51 nonstandard techniques need to be 
well-explained.  Additionally, if an expert applies certain 
techniques to a subset of the body of evidence and other 
                                                 
50 In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745. 
51 Id. at 758. 
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techniques to another subset without explanation, this raises 
an inference of unreliable application of methodology.52   
 
First, we find no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s determination that Dr. Jewell unreliably analyzed the 
trend in insignificant results.  Dr. Jewell applied this 
technique by qualitatively discussing the probative value of 
multiple positive, insignificant results.  In justifying this 
approach, he relied on a quantitative method by which one 
can calculate the likelihood of seeing multiple positive but 
insignificant results if there were actually no true effect.53  
However, after alluding to this presumably reliable 
mathematical calculation technique for analyzing trends in 
even insignificant results, Dr. Jewell did not actually 
implement it; instead he qualitatively discussed the general 
trend in the data.  In light of the opportunity to actually 
conduct such quantitative analysis, his refusal to do so—
without explanation—suggests that he did not reliably apply 
his stated methodology.54   
Even assuming the reliability of Dr. Jewell’s version of 
                                                 
52 See Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (noting that a 
scientific method of weighting must be explained to prevent a 
“conclusion-oriented selection process.”).  
53 Dr. Jewell used this as an illustrative example in his report 
and at the Daubert hearing but on appeal PSC identifies this 
technique as Fisher’s combined probability test.  Insofar as 
this is part of a meta-analysis or is sensitive to the same 
heterogeneity issues articulated by Dr. Jewell, we reiterate 
our concerns below.   
54 JA 69 (“[T]he Court finds Dr. Jewell’s failure to apply the 
methodology he outlined to the studies he reviewed 
problematic.”). 
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trend analysis, Dr. Jewell identified trends and interpreted 
insignificant results differently based on the outcome of the 
study.  The District Court concluded that Dr. Jewell 
“selectively emphasize[d] observed consistency . . . only 
when the consistent studies support his opinion.”55  Dr. Jewell 
emphasized the insignificance of results reporting odds ratios 
below 1 but not the insignificance of those reporting odds 
ratios above 1.  He also paid attention to the upper bounds of 
the confidence intervals associated with odds ratios below 1, 
but not to the lower bounds.   
 
Second, we interpret the District Court’s discussion of 
heterogeneity as raising the concern that Dr. Jewell 
selectively used meta-analyses.  He did this in two ways:  
First, without explanation, Dr. Jewell performed a meta-
analysis on two studies but not on any of the other studies.  
The District Court questioned why Dr. Jewell did not conduct 
a meta-analysis on the remaining studies instead of using the 
qualitative general trend analysis.  While Dr. Jewell was not 
required to do specific tests, the lack of explanation made his 
inconsistent application of meta-analysis to certain studies 
unreliable.56  Second, when he did perform a meta-analysis, 
Dr. Jewell only included two studies utilizing “exposed” and 
“paused” groups even though each had a different definition 
                                                 
55 JA 69.   
56 Dr. Jewell admitted that he did not “attempt to do a meta-
analysis where [he] defined an a priori – an a priori 
inclusion/exclusion set of criteria, generated a return set of 
studies, assessed heterogeneity and then considered whether 
by further adjustment or accommodation, [he] could come up 
with a meaningful set of statistics.”  He cryptically claimed 
that he “determined you couldn’t.” JA 4898. 
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of “paused,” without an adequate explanation for why these 
studies can be lumped together.  He also inexplicably 
excluded another study (Kornum (2010)) utilizing similar 
methodology.  Again, while there may have been legitimate 
reasons for these inconsistencies, the fact that he did not give 
an adequate explanation for doing so makes his testimony 
unreliable.    
 
Finally, Dr. Jewell reanalyzed two studies to control 
for confounding by indication.  The need for conducting this 
reanalysis on Huybrechts (2014) was unclear.  Dr. Jewell said 
that he wanted to control for indication by comparing the 
outcomes for “paused” Zoloft users to “exposed” Zoloft 
users; however, the study already controlled for indication.  If 
Dr. Jewell wanted to correct for misclassification, the original 
study already controlled for that as well through extensive 
sensitivity analyses.57  Given that the study originally 
concluded that Zoloft was not associated with a statistically 
significant increase in the likelihood of birth defects, this 
reanalysis seems conclusion-driven.   
 
Ultimately, the fact that Dr. Jewell applied these 
techniques inconsistently, without explanation, to different 
subsets of the body of evidence raises real issues of 
reliability.  Conclusions drawn from such unreliable 
application are themselves questionable.   
 
                                                 
57 It is true that these sensitivity analyses had less power 
because they involved looking at a subset of the population, 
making them less likely to find a significant difference; 
however, we could not find that Dr. Jewell has raised this 
point as a reason for reanalysis.   
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2. 
Using the techniques discussed above, Dr. Jewell went 
on to evaluate the Bradford Hill criteria.  While Dr. Jewell did 
discuss the applicable Bradford Hill criteria and how he 
weighed the factors together, he did not explain how he drew 
conclusions for certain criteria, namely the strength of 
association and consistency.   
 
Dr. Jewell concluded that the strength of association 
weighs in favor of causality.  In doing so, he focused on 
studies reporting odds ratios between two and three (Colvin 
(2011),58 Jimenez-Solem (2012), Malm (2011),59 Pedersen 
(2009), and Louik (2007)).  He rationalized that such a large 
association is unlikely to be associated with confounding 
alone.60  He later bolstered this argument by estimating the 
percent of the effect generally attributable to confounding by 
indication.  He estimated this percent by observing the 
percent decrease in odds ratios after controlling for indication 
over a few studies.  When pressed by counsel at the Daubert 
hearing, Dr. Jewell admitted that this was not a scientifically 
                                                 
58 JA 6011-28.  Lyn Colvin, et al., Dispensing Patterns and 
Pregnancy Outcomes for Women Dispensed Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors in Pregnancy, 91 Birth Defects 
Res. A Clin. Mol. Teratol. 142 (2011). 
59 JA 7697-7707.  Heki Malm, et al., Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitors and Risk for Major Congenital 
Anomalies, 118 Obstetrics & Gynecology 111 (2011). 
60 Dr. Jewell also notes that the link between depression and 
cardiac defects being missing undercuts the confounding by 
indication argument.  JA 7468-69.   
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rigorous adjustment.61  Such reliance on ad hoc adjustments 
supports the District Court’s decision to exclude Dr. Jewell’s 
testimony. 
Similarly, while Dr. Jewell found that the causal effect 
of Zoloft on cardiac birth defects is consistent, it is not clear 
how he drew this conclusion.  As noted above, Dr. Jewell 
classified insignificant odds ratios above one as supporting a 
“consistent” causality result, downplaying the possibility that 
they support no association between Zoloft use and cardiac 
birth defects.  While an insignificant result may be consistent 
with a causal effect, Dr. Jewell’s discussion is too far-
reaching, sometimes understating the importance of statistical 
significance.  For example, Furu (2015)—a study that 
incorporated almost all the data in Pedersen (2009), Jimenez-
Solemn (2012), and Kornum (2010)—included a larger 
sample but, unlike the former three studies, reported no 
significant association between Zoloft and cardiac birth 
defects.  Insignificant results can occur merely because a 
study lacks power to produce a significant result, and, all else 
being equal, a larger sample size increases the power of a 
test.62  Unless there are other significant differences, we 
                                                 
61 JA 7470-71 (“I said, I didn't put that in my report. I put in 
that if you wanted as a statistician, if somebody came to me 
now as you're sort of hinting at and said [Colvin] didn’t adjust 
for confounding, well, that could make a big impact, I agree, 
it could, just if I knew nothing else. . . . [A] statistician knows 
from doing simulations and computation that we alluded to 
yesterday how much of an impact could you take -- get from 
adjusting for confounding even though in this particular 
population we [aren’t] able to do it. It’s not a definitive 
result.”) 
62 Insofar as Dr. Jewell finds Furu to be less powerful than the 
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would expect Furu to be better able to capture a true effect 
than the preceding three studies.  While an insignificant result 
from a low-powered study does not necessarily undermine a 
statistically significant result from a higher-powered study, 
the opposite argument (i.e., that an insignificant finding from 
a presumably better-powered study is evidence of consistency 
with significant findings from lower-powered studies) 
requires further explanation.63  While there may be a reason 
that such a result could be consistent with the past significant 
effects, Dr. Jewell did not meaningfully discuss why this may 
be.64  Without adequate explanation, this argument 
understates the importance of statistical significance.  Like 
the expert in Magistrini, Dr. Jewell should have “sufficiently 
discredit[ed] other studies that found no association or a 
negative association with much more precise confidence 
intervals, [or] sufficiently explain[ed] why he did not accord 
weight to those studies.”65  Claiming a consistent result 
without meaningfully addressing these alternate explanations, 
as noted in In re Paoli, undermines reliability.66    
 
                                                                                                             
previous studies based on factors other than sample size, he 
has not articulated this argument.   
63 For example, Dr. Jewell could have argued that, despite 
having a larger sample, Furu (2015) was not better powered 
for other reasons or utilized flawed methodology.   
64 In fact, upon appeal, the PSC argues that Furu (2015) is 
consistent with Dr. Jewell’s causal result merely because it 
reports odds ratios above one (1.05 and 1.13).   
65 Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (emphasis added). 
66 In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 760 (noting the importance of 
explaining why a conclusion remains reliable in the face of 
alternate explanations). 
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For these reasons, the District Court determined that 
Dr. Jewell did not consistently assess the evidence supporting 
each criterion or explain his method for doing so.  Thus, it 
was not an abuse of discretion to find that Dr. Jewell’s 
application of the Bradford Hill criteria was unreliable.  
  
This is not to suggest that all of the District Court’s 
criticisms were necessarily justified.  For example, the fact 
that in his reanalysis Dr. Jewell drew a different conclusion 
from a study than its authors did is not necessarily a problem.  
Similarly, his imposition of a different assumption about the 
“exposed” group in Huybrechts (2014) did not require expert 
knowledge about psychology; he was merely testing the 
robustness of the results to Huybrechts’ original assumption.  
Similarly, the District Court credited the claim that 
overlapping samples did not provide replicated results, 
despite the fact that Dr. Jewell claimed it provided some 
informational value.67  These inquiries are more appropriately 
left to the jury.   
 
On the whole, however, the District Court did not 
improperly usurp the jury’s role in assessing Dr. Jewell’s 
credibility.  There is sufficient reason to find Dr. Jewell’s 
testimony was unreliable.  Indeed, “any step that renders the 
analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the 
expert’s testimony inadmissible.”68  The fact that Dr. Jewell 
unreliably applied the techniques underlying the weight of the 
evidence analysis and the factors of the Bradford Hill analysis 
satisfies this standard for inadmissibility.   
                                                 
67 JA 7164 (noting that overlapping analysis still “provides a 
modicum of replication”). 
68 In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745. 
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III. 
This case involves complicated facts, statistical 
methodology, and competing claims of appropriate standards 
for assessing causality from observational epidemiological 
studies.  Ultimately, however, the issue is quite clear.  As a 
gatekeeper, courts are supposed to ensure that the testimony 
given to the jury is reliable and will be more informative than 
confusing.  Dr. Jewell’s application of his purported methods 
does not satisfy this standard.  By applying different 
techniques to subsets of the data and inconsistently discussing 
statistical significance, Dr. Jewell does not reliably analyze 
the weight of the evidence.  Selecting these conclusions to 
discuss certain Bradford Hill factors also contributes to the 
unreliability.  While the District Court may have flagged a 
few issues that are not necessarily indicative of an unreliable 
application of methods, there is certainly sufficient evidence 
on the record to suggest that the court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding Dr. Jewell as an expert on the basis of 
the unreliability of his methods.  For these reasons, we will 
affirm the orders of the District Court, excluding the 
testimony of Dr. Jewell and granting summary judgment in 
favor of Pfizer. 
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